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Editor’s Note
Padraig O’Malley
University of Massachusetts Boston
When the President talks of “self-determination,” what unit has he in mind? Does he mean a
race, a territorial area, or a community? Without a definite unit which is practical, application of
this principle is dangerous to peace and stability. . . . The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite.
It will raise hopes which can never be realized. It will . . . cost thousands of lives. In the end it is
bound to be discredited, to be called the dream of an idealist who failed to realize the dangers
until too late to check those who attempt to put the principle in force. What calamity that the
phrase was ever uttered!”
——Robert Lansing, “Self-Determination,” Saturday Evening Post, April 9, 1921

Articulations of self-determination were present in the Greek city state and demos kratos, in the
writings of the fourteenth-century Italian scholar Marsilius of Padua, in the writings of the
seventeenth-century English philosopher John Locke and the Glorious Revolution when the
divine right of kings was removed and sovereignty placed in the Westminster Parliament, in the
eighteenth-century Prussian German philosopher Immanuel Kant, in the American Revolution
and the declaration of unalienable rights, in the French Revolution vesting sovereignty in the
nation, and in the early twentieth-century writings of the Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin
and the U.S. president Woodrow Wilson.
Robert Lansing was Wilson’s secretary of state. His statement refers to the absence of clarity
in Wilson’s enunciation of his doctrine of national self-determination.1 Wilson first spelled out
the doctrine in his Fourteen Points address to Congress January 8, 1918, outlining his ideas for
peace after the carnage of World War I. The points were embedded in the 1919 Versailles
Treaty, which created a new world order, and were made a foundational principle of the League
of Nations, the rules-based supranational organization established to oversee the new order.
Almost a hundred years on, the principle of self-determination is still evolving, still a
progressive force that challenges the status quo. Though numerous covenants and declarations
have brought clarity to many of the ambiguities embedded in the concept, numerous still remain.
Article 1(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), self-determination
refers to “the right of all people to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.” But there is no accepted definition of the rights
holders, who the people in “peoples” are. One interpretation argues that peoples should have “a
common group identity” and that “‘psychological perceptions and not tangible attributes’ should
form the primary basis of peoplehood.”2
On the question of self-determinations for a people within a self-governing state, the UN
Charter is explicit: there is no unilateral right of secession. This is hardly surprising since, on one
hand, for the signatories to the charter the territorial integrity of their states is paramount. On the
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other hand, paragraph 1 of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations (1970) states that self-determination is a right applicable to “all peoples.” Paragraph 4
stipulates that a people can pursue external self-determination of a “sovereign and independent
State, the free association or association with an independent State or the emergence into any
other political status freely determined by a people.” Paragraph 7, however, guarantees only the
integrity of states conducting themselves “in compliance with the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples . . . and thus possessed of a government representing the whole of
the population belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.” In other
words, discrimination of a “people” on any of these grounds would appear to open the political
pathway to secession. “The people” in question, however, may be dispersed throughout the
population, in which case secession is a nonstarter, or they may represent a cohesive group,
which satisfies the intent of the 1970 charter. In either case definitions befuddle.
Among competing groups are national minorities, ethnic minorities, majority/minority
dichotomies, Indigenous peoples (First Nation peoples), local governments, “workers”
organizations, refugees, the stateless, and women’s groups. What precisely the holders of the
right to self-determination have the right to remains a much-chewed-on bone of legal and moral
contention. Human rights advocates, argue, for example, that peoples subjected to deliberate,
sustained human rights abuses (ethnic cleansing, mass killings, or genocide) have a right to
unilateral noncolonial self-determination. Lansing’s statement was prophetic.
The right to self-determination has a powerful pull and has been the source of many violent
conflicts. In the postcolonial era, conflicts in the name of self-determination include some of the
bloodiest—the Balkans, where six new states and a disputed seventh came into being, and
Abkhazia, Chechnya, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh, Sri Lanka, West Sahara, Aceh, West
Papua, East Timor, and Southern Thailand. Among the long-standing unresolved are the
Israel/Palestinian “two-state solution” question and Cyprus. The Kurds, national minorities in
Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, were promised a homeland at the Treaty of Sevres (1923).
In Northern Ireland, the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement provides a long-term solution to the
issue of self-determination, the unification of Ireland the basis of concurrent consent for in both
jurisdictions. Brexit (external self-determination) may lead to the breakup of the United
Kingdom if Scotland opts for independence (internal self-determination) and the subsequent
political dynamics lead to a border poll on Irish unity in Northern Ireland.
Moreover, Brexit has resulted in a clash between Parliament, with which sovereignty lies,
and the will of the people, as expressed in the June 2016 referendum on exiting the European
Union, a constitutional conundrum that demands attention, especially if “the will of the people”
is a harbinger of the breakup of the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Recently,
hundreds of thousands took to the streets in Barcelona after Catalan independence leaders were
jailed for lengthy periods. Cameroon, divided by the French and English languages, hovers on
the brink of civil war as the Anglophone region seeks self-determination through either a
federation with the Francophone region or outright independence for the country it calls
Ambazonia.
Recently, too, tens of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets in Beirut, Lebanon,
Baghdad, Iraq, Santiago, Chile, and Hong Kong and before that, in countries as disparate as
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Russia, the Czech Republic, and Kazakhstan. In each case the initial
“cause” was some policy decision by the government adversely affecting “the people,” and
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though governments quickly reversed themselves, these decisions did nothing to quell the anger
of the “people,” demanding systemic change, redirecting the sources of sovereignty.
The articles in this issue of the New England Journal of Public Policy have their origins in
presentations at a Chatham House conference titled “Rethinking Self-Determination,” February
2019, hosted by the International Communities Organization and the journal.
Among the many aspects of self-determination they address: the elasticity of the concept as
a human right in the context of “peoples” (Freeman); individual rights versus collective selfdetermination (Summers); Biafra as an early case of internal self-determination—the territorial
integrity of the state and the right of secession when “the right of a people to participate in the
decision-making processes of a country is breached”3 (Brucker); European integration versus
self-determination (Ushkovska); language as an instrument of self-determination for Indigenous
peoples (Higgins and Maguire); issues relating to equal rights for Indigenous women (Redolfi et
al.); communicative justice and reconciliation in Canada (Neeson); the application of selfdetermination theory to forcibly displaced peoples’ adaptation process (Turan); selfdetermination for forcibly displaced children and in states that have not ratified the UN
Convention on Refugees and the UN Conventions on Statelessness (Herring), and interpreting
“peoples” to refer to the global population and climate change as a human right (Donlan).
What emerges is a multitude of perspectives arguing for self-determination as an expansive
concept. But, also, as Michael Freeman concludes, “in part illusory and potentially dangerous”
and hence the need to “rethink [it] because our collective thinking [about it] has been very
confused and . . . [has cost] many lives.” Robert Lansing would approve.
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